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CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON OBTAINING EVIDENCE 
FOR SCIENTIFIC ANALYSIS 
Paul C. Giannelli 
Professor of Law 
Case Western Reserve University 
Through the examination of trace evidence, 
'many scientific techniques can establish a link 
between a suspect and the scene of a crime. 
Blood, semen, hairs, fibers, soils, and fingerprints 
have all been used in this manner. In addition, 
bitemarks, gunshot residues, handwriting and 
voice exemplars have also been used to provide a 
nexus between a suspect and a crime. The use of 
these techniques often depends on some form of 
cooperation on the part of the suspect, ranging 
from his passive presence for fingerprinting and 
extraction of blood to his active participation in 
providing voice and handwriting exemplars. 
This contact between the police and a suspect 
has spawned constitutional litigation. Criminal 
defendants have argued that submission to police 
control for the purpose of obtaining evidence for 
scientific analysis: (1) violates the privilege against 
self-incrimination, (2) violates the right to counsel, 
(3) infringes upon the right to be free from unrea-
sonable searches and seizures, and (4) deprives 
the suspect of due process of law. This article ex-
amines these arguments. 
SELF-INCRIMINATION 
The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution 
prohibits compulsory self-incrimination. This prohi-
bition applies when the state seeks to compel a 
person to produce evidence that may subject that 
person to criminal liability. See generally C. 
McCormick, Evidence§§ 114-43 (2d ed. 1972); 8 J. 
Wigmore, Evidence §§ 2250-84 (McNaughton rev. 
1961). 
The leading case on the applicability of the Fifth 
Amendment privilege to the collection of physical 
evidence is Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 
(1966). While being treated at a hospital for injuries 
sustained in an automobile collision, Schmerber 
was arrested for driving under the influence of 
alcohol. Blood samples were subsequently ob-
tained from Schmerber by a physician at the direc-
tion of the investigating police officer. Although 
the defendant-on his attorney's advice-objected 
to this procedure, blood was extracted and ana-
lyzed for alcoholic content. On appeal to the 
Supreme Court, the defendant argued that the priv-
ilege against self-incrimination had been violated 
by the extraction of blood. The Court rejected this 
argument, holding that the privilege covers only 
"communicative or testimonial evidence," not 
"physical or real evidence." According to the 
Court, 
It is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches 
an accused's communications, whatever form they 
might take .... On the other hand, both federal and 
state courts have usually held that it offers no protec-
tion against compulsion to submit to fingerprinting, 
photographing, or measurements, to write or speak for 
identification, to appear in court, to stand, to assume 
a stance, to walk, or to make a particular gesture. The 
distinction which has emerged, often expressed in dif-
ferent ways, is that the privilege is a bar against com-
pelling "communications" or "testimony," but that 
compulsion which makes a suspect or accused the 
source of "real or physical evidence" does not violate 
it. /d. at 763-64. 
See also Dann, The Fifth Amendment Privilege 
Against Self-Incrimination: Extorting Physical Evi-
dence From a SUspect, 43 So. Cal. L. Rev. 597 
(1970). 
Subsequent Supreme Court cases have re-
affirmed the testimonial vs. physical evidence dis-
tinction recognized in Schmerber. In United States 
v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), the Court held that 
compelling an accused to exhibit his person for 
observation was compulsion "to exhibit his physi-
cal characteristics, not compulsion to disclose any 
knowledge he might have," id. at 222, and thus is 
not proscribed by the self-incrimination clause. In 
Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967), the Court 
concluded that the compelled production of a 
"mere handwriting exemplar, in contrast to the 
content of what is written, like the voice or body 
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itself, is an identifying physical characteristic out-
side [the Amendment's] protection." /d. at 266-67. 
Finally, in United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 
(1973), the Court again applied the Schmerber 
rationale in ruling that compelling a defendant to 
speak for the purpose of voiceprint analysis did 
not violate the Fifth Amendment because the 
"voice recordings were to be used solely to 
measure the physical properties of the witnesses' 
voices, not for the testimonial or communicative 
content of what was to be said." /d. at 7. 
Under Schmerber, obtaining evidence for vir-
tually all forensic techniques is free from Fifth 
Amendment concerns because such techniques 
use physical, not testimonial, evidence. See also 
United States v. Euge, 444 U.S. 707 (1980) (hand-
writing exemplars); United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 
19, 22 n. * (1973) (handwriting exemplars); State v. 
Ostrowski, 30 Ohio St.2d 34, 282 N.E.2d 359, cert. 
denied, 409 U.S; 890 (1972) (handwriting exem-
plars); State v. Heston, 29 Ohio St.2d 152, 280 
N.E.2d 376, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1038 (1972) (hand-
writing); State v. Olderman, 44 Ohio App.2d 130, 
336 N.E.2d 442 (1975) (voice exemplars); 8 J. 
Wigmore, Evidence § 2265 (McNaughton rev. 1961). 
Polygraph Evidence 
The one exception is polygraph evidence. The 
Court in Schmerber commented on this exception: 
Some tests seemingly directed to obtain "physical evi-
dence," tor example, lie detector tests measuring 
changes in body function during interrogation, may 
actually be directed to eliciting responses which are 
essentially testimonial. To compel a person to submit 
to testing in which an effort will be made to determine 
his guilt or innocence on the basis of physiological 
responses, whether willed or not, is to evoke the spirit 
and history of the Fifth Amendment. 384 U.S. at 764. 
The courts that have admitted polygraph evi-
dence have recognized the applicability of the 
privilege in this context. See generally Note, Prob-
lems Remaining tor the "Generally Accepted" 
Polygraph, 53 B. U. L. Rev. 375, 390-400 (1973). 
"The polygraph results ar~ essentially testimonial 
in nature and therefore a defendant could not be 
compelled initially to take such an examination on 
the Commonwealth's motion." Commonwealth v. 
A. Juvenile (No.1), 365 Mass. 421, 431, 313 N.E.2d 
120, 127 (1974). The protection of the privilege 
would also prohibit any prosecutorial comment on 
a defendant's refusal to submit to a polygraph ex-
amination. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 
(1965); Bowen v. Eyman, 324 F. Supp. 339 (D. Ariz. 
1970); McDonald v. State, 164 Ind. App. 285, 328 
N.E.2d 436 (1975). The privilege, however, may be 
waived. Thus, so long as the defendant voluntarily, 
knowingly and intelligently waives the privilege, 
the Fifth Amendment does not bar admission of 
the results of a polygraph examination. See United 
States v. Oliver, 525 F.2d 731, 734-36 (8th Cir. 1975), 
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 973 (1976); United States v. 
Ridling, 350 F. Supp. 90, 97-98 (E.D. Mich. 1972); 
State v. Souel, 53 Ohio St.2d 123, 129 n.3, 372 
N.E.2d 1318, 1321 n.3 (1978). 
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State Constitutions 
It should be noted that state law may afford a 
defendant greater self-incrimination protection 
than is afforded by federal law. For example, in 
Hansen v. Owens, 619 P.2d 315 (Utah 1980), the 
Utah Supreme Court held that compelled produc-
tion of handwriting exemplars violated the self-
incrimination clause of the Utah Constitution 
because it involved the "affirmative act of writing." 
/d. at 317. See also Creamer v. State, 229 Ga. 511, 
192 S.E.2d 350 (1972) (surgical removal of bullet; 
Georgia Constitution provides greater self-
incrimination protection than U.S. Constitution). 
RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
The Sixth Amendment guarantees an accused 
the right to counsel. This right has not been 
limited to trial but has been extended to certain 
pretrial proceedings such as the preliminary hear-
ing, Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970), and, 
under some circumstances, to identification proce-
dures, Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220 (1977), and 
interrogations. United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 
(1980); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977). 
Although defendants have argued that the right to 
counsel applies when evidence is obtained for the 
purpose of scientific analysis, this argument has 
not been successful for two reasons. 
First, the Supreme Court has held that the right 
to counsel attaches only after the "initiation of 
adversary judicial criminal proceedings-whether 
by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, in-
dictment, information, or arraignment." Kirby v. 
Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972). Frequently, evi-
dence that is submitted for scientific analysis has 
been obtained from defendants during the investi-
gatory stage, prior to the commencement of formal 
criminal proceedings. See State v. Ulrich, 609 P.2d 
1219 (Mont. 1980) (swabbings for gunshot residue 
taken before right to counsel attached). 
Second, neither the obtaining of evidence for the 
purpose of scientific analysis nor the analysis 
itself is a "critical' stage within the meaning of the 
Sixth Amendment. The leading cases are United 
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) and Gilbert v. 
California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967). In Wade the 
Supreme Court held that the right to counsel 
applied to lineup identifications. According to the 
Court, a lineup presents "grave potential for preju-
dice ... which may not be capable of reconstruc-
tion at trial, and since presence of counsel itself 
can often avert prejudice and assure a meaningful 
confrontation at trial ... ," a lineup constitutes a 
"critical stage," entitling the accused to counsel. 
388 U.S. at 236. The Court distinguished the con-
ducting of a lineup from the analysis of evidence 
by scientific techniques: 
The Government ·characterizes the lineup as a mere 
preparatory step in the gathering of the prosecution's 
evidence, not different-for Sixth Amendment pur-
poses-from various other preparatory steps, such as 
systemized or scientific analyzing of the accused's. 
fingerprints, blood sample, clothing, hair, and the l1ke. 
We think there are differences which preclude such 
stages being characterized as critical stages at which 
the accused has the right to the presence of his 
counsel. Knowledge of the techniques of science and 
technology is sufficiently available, and the variables 
.~ in techniques few enough, that the accused has the 
opportunity for a meaningful confrontation of the Gov-
ernment's case at trial through the ordinary processes 
of cross-examination of Government's expert wit-
nesses and the presentation of the evidence of his 
own experts. The denial of a right to have his counsel 
present at such analyses does not therefore violate 
the Sixth Amendment; they are not critical stages 
since there is minimal risk that his counsel's absence 
at such stages might derogate from his right to a fair 
trial. /d. at 227-28. 
In Gilbert the defendant contended that his right 
to counsel had been violated when he was com-
pelled to provide handwriting exemplars in the 
absence of counsel. The Court, however, found sig-
nificant differences between conducting a lineup 
and obtaining handwriting exemplars: 
The taking of the exemplars was not a "critical" stage 
of the criminal proceedings entitling petitioner to the 
assistance of counsel. Putting aside the fact that the 
exemplars were taken before the indictment and ap-
pointment of counsel, there was minimal risk that the 
absence of counsel might derogate from his right to a 
fair trial. Ct. United States v. Wade .... If, for some 
reason, an unrepresentative exemplar is taken, this 
can be brought out and corrected through the adver-
sary process at trial since the accused can make an 
unlimited number of additional exemplars for analysis 
and comparison by government and defense hand-
• writing experts. Thus, "the accused has the opportu-
.. nity for a meaningful confrontation of the [State's] 
case at trial through the ordinary processes of cross-
examination of the [State's] expert [handwriting] wit-
nesses and the presentation of the evidence of his 
own experts." United States v. Wade .... 388 U.S. 
at 267. 
See also United States v. Euge, 444 U.S. 707, 718 n. 
13 (1980); United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 318 n. 
10 (1973). 
Hence, unlike eyewitness identification proce-
dures, the adversary process is thought to afford a 
criminal defendant an adequate opportunity to 
confront and challenge the state's scientific evi-
dence. The ability to discover and reexamine the 
prosecution's evidence, to cross-examine the 
state's witness at trial, and to present defense 
expert witnesses minimizes the need for counsel. 
Moreover, as one court has remarked, "not only 
is the taking of the exemplars not a critical stage 
of the proceedings entitling an accused to the 
assistance of counsel, but Appellant has pointed 
to no function counsel could perform, were he 
present, save the futile advice not to give the 
sample .... " Lewis v. United States, 382 F.2d 817, 
819 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 962 (1967) 
(handwriting exemplars). Accordingly, courts have 
held the right to counsel does not apply when evi-~ dence is obtained for scientific analysis. See 
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (blood); 
United States v. Love, 482 F.2d 213 (5th Cir. 1973) 
(acetone swabbings for bomb nitrates); United 
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States v. Sanders, 477 F.2d 112 (5th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 414 U.S. 870 (1973) (palmprints); United 
States v. Sheard, 473 F.2d 139 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. 
denied, 412 U.S. 943 (1973) (blood); United States v. 
McNeal, 463 F.2d 1180 (5th Cir. 1972) (fingerprints); 
United States v. Jackson, 448 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 
1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 924 (1972) (hair); State 
v. Odom, 303 N.C. 163, 277 S.E.2d 352 (1981) (gun-
shot residues). 
The taking of a polygraph examination, however, 
raises a different issue. Because such examina-
tions implicate the Fifth Amendment, Miranda 
along with its right to counsel requirement applies. 
In addition, after the commencement of judicial 
adversary proceedings, the Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel would be applicable. See State v. 
Jones, 19 Wash. App. 850, 578 P.2d 71 (1978) (con-
fession obtained after polygraph examination vio-
lated right to counsel). 
SEARCH AND SEIZURE 
The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right to 
be free from unreasonable governmental searches 
and seizures. In some cases, evidence which is 
subjected to scientific analysis is seized from a 
specific location. Under these circumstances, the 
general Fourth Amendment law is applicable. In 
other situations, the evidence is seized from a 
suspect. The cases involving the latter situation 
are discussed in this section. 
Typically, there are two distinct Fourth Amend-
ment issues raised when physical evidence is ob-
tained from a suspect for the purpose of scientific 
analysis. First, there is a "seizure" of the person, 
which brings the suspect into contact with or 
under the control of government agents. Second, 
there is a subsequent search for and seizure of 
physical characteristics or trace evidence. United 
States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 8 (1973) (voice 
exemplar). 
Seizure of the Person 
Before trace evidence or physical characteristics 
can be obtained from a suspect, the suspect must 
be detained under some form of government con-
trol. Such control raises the question of whether 
the person has been "seized" within the meaning 
of the Fourth Amendment. Evidence submitted for 
scientific analysis has been collected from sus-
pects at the time of arrest, during pretrial incarcer-
ation, during detention on less-than-probable 
cause, and pursuant to grand jury subpoenas and 
administrative summonses. If the initial seizure of 
the person violates Fourth Amendment require-
ments, the fruits of the subsequent search of that 
person generally will be excluded at trial. See 
generally 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 11.4 
(1978) (fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine). 
Arrest 
An arrest is a "seizure" of the person within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. See 2 W. 
LaFave, Search and Seizure § 5.1 (1978). Generally, 
if the arrest is valid the seizure of physical evi-
dence incident to the arrest is also valid. While the 
arrest of a person in a public place does not re-
quire the issuance of a search warrant, it does 
require probable cause that a crime has been com-
mitted by the arrestee. United States v. Watson, 
423 U.S. 411 (1976). For example, in Schmerber v. 
California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), the defendant was 
arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol 
before blood was extracted. The Court held that 
probable cause for the arrest existed based on the 
arresting officer's observation of the defendant at 
both the scene of the accident and the hospital; 
the officer testified that the defendant's eyes were 
glassy and bloodshot and that he smelled liquor 
on the defendant's breath. /d. at 768-69. The Court 
considered the constitutionality of this initial 
seizure (the arrest) before turning to the Fourth 
Amendment implications of withdrawing blood 
from a suspect. 
In Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969), the 
Court considered the constitutionality of a deten-
tion during which fingerprints were obtained from 
the defendant. Although fingerprints and palm 
prints were found on the window used by the 
assailant to gain entry into a rape victim's house, 
the victim could not provide any further descrip-
tion of her attacker than his race and approximate 
age. The police conducted a dragnet procedure in 
which numerous young blacks, including the 
defendant, were detained and fingerprinted. The 
defendant was subsequently seized a second time 
and another set of fingerprints was obtained; these 
prints were used for comparison with the crime 
scene prints and introduced at trial. The Court 
ruled that the detention, based neither on probable 
cause nor a warrant, was illegal and thus the fin-
gerprint evidence should have been suppressed at 
trial. 
Detention on Less than Probable Cause 
In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the Supreme 
Court first recognized that a detention of a sus-
pect on less than probable cause may satisfy 
Fourth Amendment requirements. The importance 
of Terry v. Ohio and its progeny, defining the 
scope of the "stop and frisk" doctrine, to the col-
lection of physical evidence for the purpose of 
scientific analysis turns on dictum in Davis v. Mis-
sissippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969). As noted previously, 
the Court in Davis held that the detention of a sus-
pect on less than probable cause during which 
time fingerprints were obtained was unconstitu-
tional. The Court, however, made the following 
comments: 
Detentions for the sole purpose of obtaining finger-
prints are no less subject to the constraints of the 
Fourth Amendment. It is arguable, however, that, 
because of the unique nature of the fingerprinting 
process, such detentions might, under narrowly de· 
fined circumstances, be found to comply with the 
Fourth Amendment even though there is no probable 
cause in the traditional sense .... Detention for 
fingerprinting may constitute a much less serious 
intrusion upon personal security than other types of 
police searches and detentions. Fingerprinting 
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involves none of the probing into an individual's 
private life and thoughts that marks an interrogation 
or search. Nor can fingerprint detention be employed 
repeatedly to harass any individual, since the police 
need only one set of each person's prints. Further- f"~ 
more, fingerprinting is an inherently more reliable and " 
effective crime-solving tool than eyewitness identifica-
tions or confessions and is not subject to such 
abuses as the improper line-up and the "third degree." 
Finally, because there is no danger of destruction of 
fingerprints, the limited detention need not come 
unexpectedly or at an inconvenient time. For this 
same reason, the general requirement that the author-
ization of a judicial officer be obtained in advance of 
detention would seem not to admit of any exception 
in the fingerprinting context. 
We have no occasion in this case, however, to deter-
mine whether the requirements of the"Fourth Amend-
ment could be met by narrowly circumscribed proce-
dures for obtaining, during the course of a criminal in-
vestigation, the fingerprints of individuals for whom 
there is no probable cause to arrest. For it is clear 
that no attempt was made here to employ procedures 
which might comply with the requirements of the 
Fourth Amendment: The detention at polic(i! head-
quarters of petitioner and the other young Negroes 
was not authorized by a judicial officer; petitioner was 
unnecessarily required to undergo two fingerprinting 
sessions; and petitioner was not merely fingerprinted 
during the December 3 detention but also subjected 
to interrogation. /d. at 727-28. 
The invitation contained in this dictum did not go 
unanswered. A number of statutes and court rules 
providing for detention on less than probable 
cause for the purpose of nontestimonial identifica- ~ 
tion procedures have been adopted or proposed. 
See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 1305; Colo. R. Grim. P. 
41.1 (fingerprints); Idaho Code§ 19-625; N.C. Gen 
Stats. § 15A-271 to 282; Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-37 
(lineups); Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Proce-
dure art. 170 (Proposed Official Draft, 1975); Uni-
form R. Grim. P. 436 (Approved Draft, 1974). See 
generally 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.6(b) 
(1978). 
For example, an Arizona statute provides for the 
issuance of judicial orders covering "fingerprints, 
palmprints, footprints, measurements, handwriting, 
handprinting, sound of voice, blood samples, urine 
samples, saliva samples, hair samples, compara-
tive personal appearance, or photographs of an 
individual." Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 1305(D). Such an 
order may be issued if the following conditions are 
satisfied: 
1. Reasonable cause for belief that a specifically 
described offense punishable by at least one year 
in the state prison has been committed. 
2. Procurement of evidence of identifying physical 
characteristics from an identified or particularly 
described individual may contribute to the iden-
tification of the individual who committed such 
offense. 
3. Such evidence cannot otherwise be obtained by the .llil 
investigating officer from either the law enforce- " 
ment agency employing the affiant or the criminal 
identification division of the Arizona department of 
public safety. /d. § 13-3905(A). 
The constitutionality of this provision has been 
upheld by the Arizona courts. State v. Grijalva, 111 
Ariz. 476, 533 P.2d 533, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 873 
(1975) (fingerprints and hair samples); Long v. Gar-
rett, 22 Ariz. App. 397, 527 P.2d 1240 (1974) (hand-
writing exemplar). Unlike other provisions, the 
Arizona statute does not specify the quantum of 
evidence required to subject a person to such an 
order. In contrast, an Idaho statute provides that a 
nontestimonial identification order may be issued 
if "reasonable grounds exist, which may or may 
not amount to probable cause, to believe that the 
... individual committed the criminal offense." 
Idaho Code § 19-625(8). One commentator states 
that the "reasonable suspicion" standard of Terry 
v. Ohio should suffice. 3 W. LaFave, Search and 
Seizure 159 (1978). 
Several courts have refused to uphold the is-
suance of such orders in the absence of explicit 
statutory or rule authority. See United States v. 
Holland, 552 F.2d 667 (5th Cir. 1977), withdrawn, 
565 F.2d 383 (5th Cir. 1978) (handwriting 
exemplars); United States v. Jennings, 468 F.2d 111 
(9th Cir. 1972) (fingerprints); People v. Marshall, 69 
Mich. App. 288, 244 N.W.2d 451 (1976) (detention 
order for hair and blood samples must be based on 
probable cause). Other courts, however, have sanc-
tioned their use. See Wise v. Murphy, 275 A.2d 205 
(D.C. App. 1971) (lineups); In re Fingerprinting of 
M.B., 125 N.J. Super. 115, 309 A.2d 3 (1973) (finger-
prints); Merola v. Fico, 81 Misc. 2d 206, 365 
N.Y.S.2d 743 (1975) (lineup). The Supreme Court 
has yet to consider the constitutionality of deten-
tions, whether authorized by statute or not, on less 
than probable cause for the purpose of obtaining 
nontestimonial identification evidence. Neverthe-
less, the use of such a procedure, at least for the 
extraction of blood, would appear to conflict with 
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), in 
which the Court required a more demanding stand-
ard. See People v. Marshall, 69 Mich. App. 288, 
297-98, 244 N.W.2d 451, 456 (1976) ("No judicial 
precedent was found, however, which sanctioned 
the use of a court order on less than probable 
cause in order to take blood samples from a sus-
pect's person. Indeed, the constitutionality of such 
a procedure appears doubtful in light of Schmerber 
v. California ... "). 
Grand Jury Subpoenas; Administrative Summonses 
Another method by which evidence may be ob-
tained from a suspect is the grand jury subpoena. 
In United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973), the 
jefendant challenged the use of a grand jury sub-
Joena to obtain voice exemplars, arguing that 
3.ppearance before a grand jury pursuant to a sub-
)Oena was a "seizure" of the person within the 
neaning of the Fourth Amendment. The Court re-
ected this argument, holding that the "compulsion 
!Xerted by a grand jury subpoena differs from the 
•eizure effected by an arrest or even an investiga-
ive 'stop' .... " /d. at 10. 
The latter is abrupt, is effected with force or the 
threat of it and often in demeaning circumstances, 
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and, in the case of arrest, results in a record involving 
social stigma. A subpoena is served in the same man-
ner as other legal process; it involves no stigma what-
ever; if the time for appearance is inconvenient, this 
can generally be altered; and it remains at all times 
under the control and supervision of a court. /d. 
In short, since the Fourth Amendment is not impli-
cated, requirements such as probable cause, do 
not apply. The use of a grand jury subpoena for 
the purpose of obtaining handwriting exemplars as 
well as other evidence of identification has been 
upheld. See United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19 
(1973) (handwriting); In re Melvin, 550 F.2d 674 (1st 
Cir. 1977) (lineup; fingerprinting and photographing 
also involved); In re Grand Jury Proceedings 
(Schofield), 507 F.2d 963 (3d Cir. 1975) 
(fingerprints); In re Rogers, 359 F. Supp. 576 
(E.D.N.Y. 1973) (photographs); In re Toon, 364 A.2d 
1177 (D.C. App. 1976) (lineup). 
The Supreme Court has also considered whether 
an administrative summons may be used to obtain 
evidence of physical characteristics. In United 
States v. Euge, 444 U.S. 707 (1980}, the Court held 
that the Internal Revenue Service was statutorily 
authorized to issue summonses compelling a tax-
payer to provide handwriting exemplars. The court 
also found no constitutional impediment to this 
procedure. 
Search for and Seizure of Physical Evidence 
from a Suspect 
Even if a suspect's detention is constitutionally 
permissible, the question remains whether the 
search of that person is also constitutional. The 
initial inquiry is whether there is, in fact, a search 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. If 
there is a "search," the next question is whether 
the search complies with Fourth Amendment 
requirements, such as the warrant and probable 
cause requirements. 
Physical Characteristics; 
Reasonable Expectations of Privacy 
The leading case on defining what governmental 
activities are "searches" within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment is Katz v. United States, 389 
U.S. 347 (1967). Katz substituted a privacy 
approach for the traditional property approach to 
this issue. According to the Court: 
The Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. 
What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even 
in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth 
Amendment protection .... But what he seeks to pre-
serve as private, even in an area accessible to the 
public, may be constitutionally protected. /d. at 351. 
The Katz rationale played a major role in two 
cases which involved the compelled production of 
voice and handwriting exemplars by means of a 
grand jury subpoena. In United States v. Dionisio, 
410 U.S. 1 (1973), after ruling that the compelled 
appearance of a person before a grand jury was 
not a "seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment, the Court addressed the issue of 
whether the taking of a voice exemplar constituted 
a "search." 
The physical characteristics of a person's voice, its 
tone and manner, as opposed to the content of a spe-
cific conversation, are constantly exposed to the 
public. Like a man's facial characteristics, or hand-
writing, his voice is repeatedly produced for others to 
hear. No person can have a reasonable expectation 
that others will not .know the sound of his voice, any 
more than he can reasonably expect that his face will 
be a mystery to the world. /d. at 14. 
In United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19 (1973), the 
Court reached the same conclusion with respect to 
handwriting. "Handwriting, like speech, is 
repeatedly shown to the public, and there is no 
more expectation of privacy in the physical charac-
teristics of a person's script than there is in the 
tone of his voice." /d. at 21. See also United States 
v. Euge, 444 U.S. 707, 713 (1980) ("compulsion of 
handwriting exemplars is neither a search or 
seizure subject to Fourth Amendment protec-
tions .... "). 
All evidence of physical characteristics, how-
ever, is not beyond Fourth Amendment protection. 
In Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), 
decided before Dionisio, the Court held that the 
extraction of blood for the purpose of scientific 
analysis "plainly constitute searches of the 'per-
sons' ... ," id. at 767, within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment. Moreover, the Court in 
Dionisio distinguished, rather than overruled, 
Schmerber. "The required disclosure of a person's 
voice is thus immeasurably further removed from 
the Fourth Amendment protection than was the in-
trusion into the body effected by the blood extrac-
tion in Schmerber." 410 U.S. at 14. Thus, there are 
two categories in which the seizing of physical 
evidence may fall-one within the scope of the 
Fourth Amendment protection (Schmerber), and 
one without it (Dionisio-Mara). Determining in 
which category government activity falls is not 
always an easy task. 
One other case sheds light on this issue. In 
Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973), the Court con-
sidered the legality of seizing fingernail scrapings 
from a suspect. After findi_ng that the defendant 
had been detained on probable cause, the Court 
stated: 
The inquiry does not end here, however, because 
Murphy was subjected to a search as well as a 
seizure of his person. Unlike the fingerprinting in 
Davis, the voice exemplar obtained in United States v. 
Dionisio .... , or the handwriting exemplar obtained in 
United States v. Mara .... , the search of the respond-
ent's fingernails went beyond mere "physical charac-
teristics ... constantly exposed to the public," United 
States v. Dionisio .... , and constituted the type of 
''severe, though brief, intrusion upon cherished per-
sonal security" that is subject to constitutional scru-
tiny. /d. at 295. 
Thus, the taking of fingernail scrapings, like the 
blood extraction in Schmerber, falls within Fourth 
Amendment protection, whereas the taking of fin-
gerprints, like the taking of voice and handwriting 
exemplars, does not. Why a person has a reason-
able expectation of privacy with respect to sub-
stances under his fingernails but not to his finger-
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prints, a fraction of an inch away, is difficult to 
discern. Apparently, any procedure that is more 
intrusive than obtaining fingerprints, voice or hand-
writing exemplars is covered by the Fourth Amend-
ment. See also United States v. Holland, 378 F. 
Supp. 144 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (dental examination not a 
search because no reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy). This view is supported by cases involving 
the obtaining of breath samples, see Common-
wealth v. Quarles, 229 Pa. Super. 363, 324 A.2d 452 
(1974), and hair samples, see United States v. 
D'Amico, 408 F.2d 331, 333 (2d Cir. 1969); State v. 
Sharpe, 284 N.C. 157, 200 S.E.2d 44 (1973), which 
have been considered subject to constitutional 
constraints. See generally 1 W. LaFave, Search 
and Seizure § 2.6(a) (1978). 
Searches Incident to Arrest 
If the obtaining of physical evidence from a 
properly detained suspect is considered a search, 
that search must satisfy constitutional require-
ments. In other words, once the applicability of the 
Fourth Amendment is recognized, such questions 
as the existence of probable cause and the neces-
sity of obtaining a warrant are raised. One of the 
major exceptions to the warrant requirement is the 
search incident to arrest doctrine. Under this 
exception, once a suspect has been arrested, 
based upon probable cause, a search of the ar-
restee's person and the area within his immediate 
control is permitted. The justific(3.tion for this ex-
ception is set forth in Chime! v. California, 395 U.S. 
752 (1969): 
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the 
arresting officer to search the person arrested in order 
to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to 
use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape. 
Otherwise, the officer's safety might well be endan-
gered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is 
entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search 
for and seize any evidence of the arrestee's person in 
order to prevent its concealment or destruction. And 
the areas into which an arrestee might reach in order 
to grab a weapon or evidentiary items must, of 
course, be governed by a like rule. /d. at 762-63. 
Several Supreme Court cases involving the 
seizure of evidence for the purpose of scientific 
analysis have turned on the search incident to 
arrest theory. In Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 
(1973), the Supreme Court upheld a search and 
seizure of fingernail scrapings under the Chime/ 
doctrine. During the voluntary stationhouse ques-
tioning of the defendant about his wife's strangu-
lation murder, the police observed a dark spot on 
the defendant's finger, which they believed to be 
blood. Despite the defendant's protests, fingernail 
scrapings were taken. The scrapings contained 
traces of skin and blood as well as fabric from the 
victim's garments. The facts of Cupp v. Murphy are 
somewhat unusual because the defendant was not 
formally placed under arrest at the time the scrap-
ings were removed. Nevertheless, the Court held 
that the "rationale of Chime!, in these circum-
stances, justified the police in subjecting him to 
the very limited search necessary to preserve the 
highly evanescent evidence they found under his 
fingernails." !d. at 296. 
In United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (197 4), 
the defendant was arrested at night and then 
1.; incarcerated in a local jail for attempting to break 
into a Post Office. Investigation at the scene 
revealed paint chips at a window of the Post 
Office. The following.morning the defendant's 
clothes were seized .. Examination of the clothes 
disclosed paint chips which matched those found 
at the scene of the crime. The Supreme Court held 
that the delayed search of the clothing was consti-
tutionalr notwithstanding the absence of a warrant. 
According to the Court, the established rule is that 
once the defendant is lawfully arrested and is in 
custody, the effects in his possession at the place of 
detention that were subject to search at the time and 
place of his arrest may lawfully be searched and 
seized without a warrant even though a substantial 
period of time has elapsed between the arrest and 
subsequent administrative processing, on the one 
hand, and the taking of the property for use as evi-
dence, on the other. This is true where the clothing or 
effects are immediately seized upon arrival at the jail, 
held under the defendant's name in the "property 
room" of the jail, and at a later time searched and 
taken for use at the subsequent criminal trial. The 
result is the same where the property is not physically 
taken from the defendant until sometime after his 
incarceration. /d. at 807-08. 
The seizure of gunshot residue, State v. Ulrich, 
609 P.2d 1218 (Mont. 1980); bomb residue, United 
States v. Love, 482 F.2d 213 (5th Cir. 1973); and fin-~: gerprints, Napolitano v. United States, 340 F.2d 313 
(1st Cir. 1965), have all been upheld as incidental 
to arrest. More intrusive searches, such as those 
involving the extraction of blood, however, require 
greater justification. 
Bodily Intrusions 
The Supreme Court has shown a greater concern 
for searches involving bodily intrusions than for 
other types of searches. For example, in 
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), the 
Court considered the constitutionality of extracting 
blood for the purpose of blood-alcohol analysis. 
The Court rejected the notion that the extraction of 
blood would aut0matically be encompassed by the 
search incident to arrest doctrine. According to the 
Court, the justifications underlying the search inci-
dent to arrest rule "have little applicability with 
respect to searches involving intrusions beyond 
the body's surface. The interests in human dignity 
and privacy which the Fourth Amendment protects 
forbids any such intrusions on the mere chance 
that desired evidence might be obtained. In the 
absence of a clear indication that in fact such evi-
dence will be found, these fundamental human 
interests require law officers to suffer the risk that 
such evidence may disappear unless there is an 
immediate search." /d. at 769-70. 
The Court went on to consider the necessity of 
securing a warrant based on probable cause as a 
Prerequisite to the extraction of blood. The Court 
found that the purpose underlying the warrant 
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requirement-the intervention of a neutral 
detached magistrate between the police and the 
citizen-was applicable to bodily intrusions. "The 
importance of the informed, detached and deliber-
ate determinations of the issue whether or. not to 
invade another's body in search of evidence of 
guilt is indisputable and great." /d. at 770. Never-
theless, because the alcohol content of blood 
diminishes with the passage of time, the court 
recognized an "emergency" exception to the war-
rant requirement which was necessary to preclude 
the destruction of evidence. The emergency excep-
tion recognized in Schmerber, however, would not 
apply in other contexts-for example, when blood 
is sought for the purpose of typing, a physical 
characteristic that remains constant. See Graves v. 
Beto, 301 F. Supp. 264 (E.D. Tex. 1969), aff'd, 424 
F.2d 524 (5th Cir. 1970); Mills v. State, 28 Md. App. 
300, 307, 345 A.2d 127, 132 (1975). See also State v. 
Gammill, 2 Kan. App.2d 627, 585 P.2d 1074 (1978) 
(hair follicle, no emergency as in Schmerber). 
Schmerber is also important because the Court 
held that the scientific procedure chosen as well 
as the manner in which it is performed are both 
subject to the Fourth Amendment reasonableness 
requirement. With respect to the procedure, the 
Court commented, "we are satisfied that the test 
chosen to measure petitioner's blood-alcohol level 
was a reasonable one. Extraction of blood samples 
for testing is a highly effective means of determin-
ing the degree to which a person is under the influ-
ence of alcohol." 384 U.S. at 771. The Court also 
found that the "record shows that the test was 
performed in a reasonable manner. Petitioner's 
blood was taken by a physician in a hospital envi-
ronment according to accepted medical 
practices." /d. 
The most intrusive procedures that have been 
challenged on Fourth Amendment grounds have 
concerned the surgical removal of bullets from 
suspects for the purpose of firearms identification. 
The leading case is United States v. Crowder, 543 
F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062 
(1977), in which the defendant was ordered to 
undergo minor surgery for the removal of bullet 
fragments from his arm. The Court of Appeals for 
the D.C. Circuit upheld the removal of the bullet, 
citing the following factors: 
(1) the evidence sought was relevant, could have been 
obtained in no other way, and there was probable 
cause to believe that the operation would produce it; 
(2) the operation was minor, was performed by a 
skilled surgeon, and every possible precaution was 
taken to guard against any surgical complications, so 
that the risk of permanent injury was minimal; (3) 
before the operation was performed the District Court 
held an adversary hearing at which the defendant 
appeared with counsel; (4) thereafter and before the 
operation was performed the defendant was afforded 
an opportunity for appellate review by this court. 
/d. at 316. 
Other courts have also found no constitutional 
impediment to court-authorized minor surgery. See 
Creamer v. State, 229 Ga. 511, 192 S.E.2d 350 
(1972), cert. dismissed, 410 U.S. 975 (1973); Allison 
v. State, 129 Ga. App. 364, 199 S.E.2d 587 (1973); 
State v. Martin, 404 S.2d 960 (La. 1981). On the 
other hand, where surgery could not be considered 
minor courts have refused to authorize it. See 
Bowden v. State, 256 Ark. 820, 510 S.W.2d 879 
(1974); People v. Smith, 80 Misc.2d 210, 362 
N.Y.S.2d 909 (1974). Moreover, one court has held 
minor surgery unconstitutional in the absence of 
court approval, State v. Overstreet, 551 S.W.2d 621 
(Mo. 1977), and another court has refused to 
authorize any surgical removal, even if minor. 
Adams v. State, 260 Ind. 663, 299 N.E.2d 834 (1973), 
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 935 (1974). See generally 3 W. 
LaFave, Search and Seizure§ 4.1(d) (1978); Smith, 
The Police and Prosecutors Right to Surgical 
Removal of Embedded Evidence from an Accused, 
5 J. Pol. Sci. & Ad. 348 (1977); 55 Tex. L. Rev. 
(1976). 
DUE PROCESS 
The seizure of evidence for the purpose of scien-
tific analysis has been challenged on due process 
grounds in a number of cases. In Rochin v. Cali-
fornia, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), the Supreme Court held 
that the forcible stomach pumping of a suspect to 
recover narcotic pills "shocks the conscience" and 
does not comport with traditional ideas of fair play 
and decency, thereby violating due process. The 
Court distinguished Rochin in a later case, 
Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957). In that 
case the Court upheld the compelled extraction of 
blood in the face of a due process challenge. In 
distinguishing the extraction of stomach contents 
from the extraction of blood, the Breithaupt Court 
emphasized that the latter procedure, "under the 
protective eye of a physician," was a routine and 
scientifically accurate method and therefore did 
not involve the "brutality" and "offensiveness" 
present in Rochin. /d. at 435. This ruling was 
reaffirmed in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 
(1966). 
The Rochin and Breithaupt decisions predated 
the applicability of the Bill of Rights to the States 
through the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and thus the continued validity of an 
independent due process analysis is questionable. 
Such issues no longer need be addressed in terms 
of due process but rather as possible violations of 
specific constitutional guarantees enumerated in 
the Bill of Rights. For example, according to the 
Court in Schmerber v. California, the manner in 
which evidence is obtained from a suspect is sub-
ject to the reasonableness clause of the Fourth 
Amendment. This requirement would encompass 
virtually all cases that are vulnerable to attack on 
due process grounds. 
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
Self Incrimination 
The Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit's 
decision that the Fourteenth Amendment requires 
a hearing before the Parole Authority can rescind a 
decision to grant early parole. The Court held that 
the principle of "mutually explicit understandings" 
relied upon to find constitutionally protected pro-
perty interests does not lend itself to determining 
the existence of a constitutionally protected liberty 
interest in the setting of prisoner parole. Although 
the Court acknowledged that respondent suffered 
a "grevious loss", because the statutes which pro-
vide for parole place the decision wholly within the 
discretion of the Parole Authority, the Court found 
no protected liberty interest and held that respon-
dent was not entitled to a prior hearing. Jago v. 
Van Curen, 102 S. Ct. 31 (1981). 
Public Defenders-1983 Actions 
Relying on a public defender's employment by 
the County, a convicted defendant brought a 1983 
action against a public defender, Polk County, the 
Polk County Offender Advocate, and the County 
Board of Supervisors alleging that his consititu-
tional rights were violated when the public 
defender moved to withdraw as counsel on the 
ground that the defendant's appellate claims were 
frivolous. Reversing the 8th Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, the Supreme Court held that a public 
defender when representing an indigent defendant 
does not act "under color of state law" within the 
meaning of section 1983. The Court also ruled that 
the defendant failed to state a claim against the 
remaining defendants because he failed to allege 
any official policy that arguably violated his con-
stitutional rights. Polk County v. Dodson, 102 S. Ct. 
445 (1981). 
Post-Arrest Silence 
In a case involving the use of a defendant's 
silence between his arrest and the giving of Miran-
da warnings, the Sixth Circuit held that it was fun-
damentally unfair to use this silence to impeach 
the defendant. The Court concluded that post-
arrest silence was not probative because fear and 
anxiety will lead the defendant, whether guilty or 
innocent, to remain silent. The Court's second 
reason not to permit use of post-arrest silence for 
impeachment is the widespread knowledge that 
one who is arrested has the right to remain silent. 
Persons who are exercising their right to remain 
silent should not be penalized for it. Weir v. Flet-
cher, 30 Grim. L. Rptr. 2052 (6th Cir. 1981). 
